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Abstract
Over the past twenty years, the number of devices connected to the
Internet grew exponentially. Botnets benefited from this rise to increase
their size and the magnitude of their attacks. However, they still have a
weak point in their Command & Control (C&C) system, which is often
based on centralized services or require a complex infrastructure to keep
operating without being taken down by authorities. The recent spread of
blockchain technologies may give botnets a powerful tool to make them
very hard to disrupt. Recent research showed how it is possible to embed
C&C messages in Bitcoin transactions, making them nearly impossible
to block. Nevertheless, transactions have a cost and allow very limited
amounts of data to be transmitted. Because of that, only messages from
the botmaster to the bots are sent via Bitcoin, while bots are assumed
to communicate through external channels. Furthermore, for the same
reason, Bitcoin-based messages are sent in clear. In this paper we show
how, using Bitcoin Testnet, it is possible to overcome these limitations and
implement a cost-free, bidirectional, and encrypted C&C channel between
the botmaster and the bots. We propose a communication protocol and
analyze its viability in real life. Our results show that this approach
would enable a botmaster to build a robust and hard-to-disrupt C&C
system at virtually no cost, thus representing a realistic threat for which
countermeasures should be devised.
1 Introduction
A botnets is a network of infected devices, called bots, collectively controlled
by a single actor, called the botmaster. Botnets have been a major threat on
the Internet for a long time, being used for a variety of malicious activities,
like spamming, credentials stealing, and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks[17]. A lot of research has been done to help detect and disrupt such
activities on the web[12]. However, the frequency and magnitude of botnet
attacks drastically increased in the past few years, due to the massive adoption
of computing devices and the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), which
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is connecting millions of insecure devices to the web[7]. Recent attacks from
the infamous Mirai botnet[4], showed the potential of this threat, with DDoS
attacks of up to 1.1 Tbps[15].
Meanwhile, blockchain is also becoming increasingly adopted as a tool for
building distributed systems where different parties are able to exchange assets
and data in a trustworthy manner[24]. Recent research showed how blockchains
can be leveraged to implement the command and control (C&C) system of a
botnet[2][13]. In fact, using public blockchains, like Bitcoin, as the commu-
nication channel has several advantages for a botnet. First of all, they come
with the strengths of all distributed networks, such as robustness and efficiency.
Secondly, they are not regulated by any authority, making them censorship-
resistant, meaning that no specific content or user can be banned. Furthermore,
they privilege privacy, by making use of pseudonyms and hindering the associa-
tion between a transaction and the device that generated it. As such, although
possible[9][16], it is not trivial to identify nodes participating in a botnet, and
even more importantly, to identify the botmaster. All such properties are ideal
for a botnet[27], as they allow to operate, protected, over a long period of time,
with virtually no risk of having communications disrupted.
Most state-of-the-art research proposes Bitcoin transactions as the main
C&C vector, following different strategies to embed commands from the bot-
master. However, these proposals have important limitations. First of all, they
only cover communications from the botmaster, delegating replies form the bots
to external channels, typically employing a web server. Furthermore, messages
are very limited in size and are sent in clear, as cryptography is only imple-
mented on the external channel. Finally, messages have a cost, since they are
sent via transactions. All these limitations make this approach seem impractical
or inconvenient for a real-world botnet implementation.
In this paper, we show it is possible to overcome such limitations by leverag-
ing the Testnet network, instead of Mainnet. We propose a bidirectional commu-
nication protocol that implements encryption and allows bigger amounts of data
to be exchanged. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study
bidirectional C&C communications on top of Bitcoin. Our approach makes a
fully-blockchain-based botnet implementation both practical and economical.
Organization of the Paper The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the necessary background topics, that is Botnet C&C and
Bitcoin. Section 3 covers previous research work and discuss its limitations. In
Section 4, we show the advantages of using Testnet as the C&C channel. In
Section 5, we describe our communication protocol design and in Section 6 we
show our experimental results. Section 7 analyzes the viability and robustness
of our proposal. Section 8 concludes the paper and discuss future work.
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2 Background
2.1 Botnet C&C Communication
In order for a botnet to operate, a communication channel is needed between
botmaster and bots. The infrastructure used for that purpose is known as the
Command & Control (C&C) system. This is a crucial component for a botnet,
as it is the only means to keep control over the bots. As such, it is has to
be designed carefully, in order to avoid being disrupted. In other words, the
C&C system should allow controlling the botnet as long as possible, providing
stealthy and efficient communication between botmaster and bots.
Strategies to implement C&C changed over the years, following the evo-
lution of available technologies and the ability of authorities to counter exist-
ing approaches[20]. First-generation botnets leverage hardcoded Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) channels, where bots connect to receive instructions from the bot-
master. This system is simple and cheap but is also easy to detect and take
down[8][1]. Second-generation botnets make use of HTTP, with hardcoded web
domains, periodically contacted by the bots to download instructions. This
approach allows to effectively blend messages into legitimate Internet traffic.
Nonetheless, effective techniques exist to detect botnet communications[18][14],
allowing to quickly shutdown malicious domains[29].
Early botnets relied on a client-server model, thus having a central point
of failure, which can always be detected and shut down by the authorities.
Last generation botnets overcome this issue by adopting a P2P model. Bots
and C&C server connect as peers to the same network, making it difficult to
distinguish the source of the commands[28]. This architecture makes the botnet
much more robust and hard to shut down. Nonetheless, it is still possible to
detect P2P-botnet traffic using advanced techniques[22][25]. Moreover, to join
the network, bots need hardcoded addresses, which can be easily blocked by
authorities if detected. Modern botnets tend to use a mix of techniques, such
as P2P network with HTTP C&C server, or leverage cloud-based services and
social media as rendezvous points[20]. Although these services are easy to setup
and access, providers can promptly block any detected malicious account.
2.2 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a digital payment system released in 2009. Participating actors are
identified by alphanumeric strings called addresses. Each address represents the
public part of an (asymmetric) cryptographic key pair, whose private part is used
by the owner to sign transactions. When a coin is sent to a specific address,
only the owner of the corresponding private key can spend it. Transactions are
validated by nodes of a P2P network that cooperate to maintain a distributed
ledger, structured as a chain of blocks (or blockchain). Each block contains a
set of valid transactions and is linked to the previous one by including its hash.
Blocks are concurrently created by special nodes called miners, which compute
the solution of a cryptographic puzzle over the transactions of the new block.
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This solution is known as Proof of Work (PoW) and is included in the block
itself. Transactions and blocks are validated and distributed by all the peers of
the network. To decide on conflicting versions of the ledger, peers always choose
the longest chain they know, that is the one with the biggest PoW. By following
this scheme, the ledger is considered to be immutable and able to avoid double
spending the same coin[23].
OP RETURN Since 2014, it is possible to embed a small amount of data
inside a transaction, using the OP RETURN opcode[30]. This possibility was
introduced to discourage other wasteful methods of embedding data, such as
using non-existing transaction output addresses. The new opcode allows adding
a non-spendable output, which carries up to 80 bytes of arbitrary data. OP -
RETURN is often used to implement asset exchange protocols on top of Bitcoin
or to add valuable data in the blockchain[6].
Testnet As other public blockchains, Bitcoin provides a separate network for
developers to test their applications, known as Testnet[31]. While running the
same protocol as the main network (Mainnet), Testnet has some important
differences. First of all, Testnet coins (tBTC) have no real value, and can be
easily obtained via online services called faucets. Secondly, the mining difficulty
is also set to a lower value than Mainnet, making the blockchain grow faster.
Finally, some restrictions are ignored to allow developers to test edge cases. In
particular, non-standard transactions are allowed, thus being relayed and mined
by the network. We will see how these and other characteristics significantly
help implementing a botnet C&C.
Bitcoin nodes There are two main options to access the Bitcoin blockchain:
full nodes and Simple Payment Verification (SPV) nodes. Full nodes are the
building blocks of the P2P network. They validate all transactions and blocks,
and relaying them to their peers. This is the most secure way to use Bitcoin,
but requires to download the whole blockchain, which can be very resource-
consuming. SPV nodes, like full nodes, receive and relay all transactions, but
do not download the whole blockchain. Instead, they only download block
headers and rely on other peers to retrieve the blocks they need to validate
transactions of interest. This make the node suitable for resource-constrained
devices at the expense of a certain level of trust into other peers. Thanks to
their better performances, SPV nodes are today the most popular choice on
Bitcoin[26].
3 Related Work
ZombieCoin[2] was the first paper to propose Bitcoin as a means for C&C com-
munications. Bots embed the botmaster public key and decode transactions
coming from the corresponding address. To embed commands, the OP RE-
TURN opcode is used, which allows to carry up to 80 bytes of data. In [3]
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the same authors propose enhancements such as transaction-chaining to embed
longer messages and external upstream communication by means of periodical
rendezvous-point announcements. The main limitations of this proposal are
the server-based upstream communication and the cost of messages sent on the
blockchain. The authors claim that it would be impractical and economically
prohibitive to implement upstream communication on top of the blockchain.
We show that this is not true when leveraging Testnet.
ChainChannels [13] proposes a more generic approach, which can be used
on different blockchains as it does not leverage Bitcoin-specific features. The
authors describe a method to insert hidden data into transaction signature,
which can be later decoded with the private key used for the signature. For this
purpose, the authors propose a key-leakage scheme that allows bots to deci-
pher messages at a later time. This is a very portable approach, since virtually
all blockchains employ digitally-signed transactions with a compatible signa-
ture scheme. Nonetheless, this approach suffers from the same limitations as
ZombieCoin: messages are costly and limited in size; communication is unidi-
rectional and unencrypted. Furthermore, bots can only decrypt messages in a
second moment, assuming they execute commands altogether after these have
been issued, something that might not be realistic.
In [5], the authors propose an approach based on Whisper, a communication
protocol that runs on top of the Ethereum network. This approach does not
use transactions and thus has no cost. It also provides a good level of privacy
and allows for two-way communication. Moreover, as messages are not in trans-
actions, they are not added to the blockchain, making their backward analysis
harder. However, Whisper, which is still in a PoC stage, it is not enabled by de-
fault on the standard Ethereum client (geth) and there are no known statistics
about how many nodes currently run the protocol. Consequently, its reliability
is unknown, making it unlikely to be actually used by a botnet as of today.
4 Leveraging the Testnet Network
As explained in Section 2, Bitcoin Testnet follows the same protocol as the
Mainnet but has some important differences. In particular:
• Testnet coins have no value in real life. For this reason, they can be easily
obtained for free through online services called faucets [31].
• Mining is much easier, since the PoW difficulty is set to a lower value.
As a consequence, unlike Mainnet, it is feasible to run a solo miner[19] to
earn coins.
• The Testnet network and blockchain are about ten times smaller than
Mainnet[11]. This makes clients synchronize faster and consume less re-
sources.
• Non-standard transactions are validated and relayed by the network. This
feature enables the following characteristics:
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– OP RETURN can be bigger than 80 bytes. In fact, there is no ex-
plicit limit to the amount of data that can be actually embedded;
– Transactions can have multiple outputs with the same address as well
as multiple OP RETURNs;
– Transaction outputs can be below the dust limit1;
– Transaction size can be greater than the maximum (which is around
100kB).
All these properties give numerous benefits for the implementation of a bot-
net. First of all, the botmaster can easily obtain the necessary amount of
coins to run its botnet, either by using faucets or running a miner. Secondly,
the reduced size of Testnet blockchain and network make bots less resource-
demanding, allowing them to hinder detection and even to run on low-resource
devices. Finally, non-standard transactions give the ability to send bigger and
more complex messages.
These features allow overcoming all the main drawbacks of previous Bitcoin-
based proposals: botnet communications have no cost thanks to the fact that
Testnet coins have no real value; bidirectional communication can be imple-
mented thanks to the great number of coins that can be obtained for free;
encryption can be implemented thanks to the larger amount of data that can
be embedded in each transaction.
5 Botnet Design
In this section, we propose a viable communication protocol for Testnet, based
on non-standard transactions, that provides a bidirectional and encrypted C&C
channel at zero cost.
As in previous works, we assume there exist an infection mechanism that
takes control of devices and downloads the bot client. The botnet is composed
by a C&C server node, directly controlled by the botmaster, and a number of
bot nodes. We assume the C&C server is not resource-constrained and runs a
full node. On the other side, bots run an SPV node to consume less resources
and hinder detection.
In the rest of this section, we explain how the communication works (trans-
actions, fees and encryption) and describe the different phases of the protocol
(registration, commands and responses).
5.1 Communication
All communications between the botmaster and the bots happen through trans-
actions.
1On Bitcoin, it is considered dust any output smaller than the amount needed to spend
that output. Hence its value actually depends on the transaction size, but its minimum is
usually considered to be 546 satoshis
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Data Embedding and Fees We use OP RETURN outputs to embed mes-
sages inside transactions. As previously mentioned, this operator has no explicit
limits of size on Testnet. As such, the amount of data that can be embedded is
only limited by the maximum size of a transaction, which, again, is not explic-
itly limited on Testnet. This makes the theoretical size limit bound by the size
of a block (around 1 MB). However, a practical limit to this amount is given by
the minimum fee needed to have the transaction relayed by other peers. This
value is known as the minimum relay fee (MRF). MRF does not differ between
Mainnet and Testnet and is proportional to the size of the transaction itself.
This means that, although sending very large messages is possible, this can be
excessively expensive in terms of fees. We will see more details about MRF later
in Sections 6 and 7.
In our protocol, all transactions spend a fee equivalent to the corresponding
MRF. To this respect, it is important to notice that using low fees might make
the transaction mined later. However, from the botnet perspective, it is not
important if and when messages are added to the blockchain, but only if they
travel across the network and reach the C&C server.
Encryption and Authentication In order to protect communications, we
use encryption in both directions. To obtain the best compromise between
security and efficiency, we make use of an hybrid approach.
We assume the botmaster creates an asymmetric key pair, called botmaster
keys before the creation of the botnet and hardcode bots with the public key.
This key pair is completely unrelated to the address used to send commands,
which in fact, can change at every message. Additionally, a symmetric key is
also embedded in the bots, called botnet key.
For the sake of clarity, we distinguish between downlink encryption, used
from the botmaster to the bots, and uplink encryption, used by the bots to
communicate with the botmaster.
Downlink encryption works this way: when the botmaster wants to send
a command, it encrypts it with the botnet key and signs it with its private
key; when bots receive a transaction with an OP RETURN, they check the
signature using the botmaster public key. If the signature is valid, they decrypt
the message with the botnet key and execute the command. This scheme allows
the bots to recognize transactions from the botmaster even without knowing
its address. Moreover, thanks to the signature, bots are assured about the
authenticity of the source.
For uplink encryption, each bot creates a private symmetric key, called the
bot key, which is sent to the botmaster at the time of registration, encrypted
with the botmaster public key. When sending messages, bots encrypt data with
their bot key. Furthermore, bots use a new address for each message, which
corresponds to the change address of the previous transaction. In order to
recognize and decrypt bots messages, the botmaster keeps track of the current
address of each bot and the corresponding encryption key.
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Transactions We have the following types of transactions: quotas, registra-
tions, fundings, and messages. Quotas have one input and several outputs (the
quotas), which are used as input for the registration transactions. Registration
transactions have one input (a quota) and one OP RETURN output. The quota
equals the MRF for the registration message, so no change output is required.
Funding transactions have one input and one output, which equals the input
value minus the MRF. Messages (commands and responses) always have two
outputs, one with the OP RETURN carrying the message and the other send-
ing the change (minus the MRF) to another address belonging to the sender
(i.e. the change address).
5.2 Bot Registration
When a new bot joins the network, the first thing it needs is to get some funds
to send transactions. As the bot cannot obtain funds autonomously (like the
botmaster does), it needs to ask the botmaster to provide some. However, at
the same time, the botmaster needs to know the address of the bot in order to
send such funds.
We solve this problem by having all bots sharing a common private key,
that gives access to all transactions of an address called the shared account.
The botmaster periodically puts funds on the account, while new bots use such
funds to register to the botnet. They do so by sending a registration message
which contains their own address and encryption key. Since SPV clients do
not store the UTXO set (the set of unspent transactions), they ask their peers
about any available fund on the account. The botmaster monitors transactions
sent from the shared account and when it detects one, it stores the information
about the new bot and sends it some funds. After the registration, bots will
only receive funds directly from the botmaster.
If more bots try to register at the same time, there might be a conflict be-
tween their transactions (i.e. a double spend). In order to minimize this risk, the
botmaster puts on the account several transactions, called quotas, containing
just the right amount of coins needed to send the registration message. Further-
more, to reduce concurrency, it always sends multiple quotas at the same time.
When a new bot wants to register, it picks a random quota and tries to send the
message. It then sets a timeout for receiving the funding from the botmaster. If
the timeout expires, the bot picks another quota and repeats the process. The
same happens if its transaction gets rejected by peers or if another transaction
spending the same quota is detected. At any time, the botmaster makes sure
there are enough quotas on the shared account, according to the rate at which
new bots are joining.
Since the registration transaction comes from a shared account and only has
an OP RETURN output, neither the botmaster address nor the bot one are
revealed.
It is worth noting that creating quotas would not be possible on Mainnet,
as they would be considered as dust outputs and rejected by the network.
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5.3 Commands and Responses
We distinguish between commands, that are messages sent by the botmaster,
and responses, that bots send after executing a command. Bots can execute
three types of commands: hardcoded, shell and script.
Hardcoded commands are functions that are already implemented by the bot
code. They can be executed once or repeated over a period of time. Examples of
hardcoded commands include a DoS function to attack a target or a keylogger
to steal credentials. The botmaster can send parameters such as interval and
number of iterations, or make the function run indefinitely until it sends a stop
command.
Shell commands are command-line instructions that the bot directly execute
on the infected machine. When the bot receives such command, it runs it and
converts the output into a hexadecimal string to be sent as a response.
Script commands work similarly, but they use code stored on the blockchain.
In particular, the code to execute is embedded by the botmaster in a previ-
ous transaction, called script transaction, and encrypted with a symmetric key,
which is unknown to the bots. The command includes the transaction ID of the
script transaction and the key to decrypt. When bots receive these commands,
they retrieve the data, decrypt the payload and execute the code. They then
convert the output into a hexadecimal string and send it the botmaster. In order
to ensure all bots can send their response, the botmaster checks current funds
of each bot before sending the command. If any bot does not have sufficient
funds, the botmaster sends them more coins.
This approach takes advantage of the larger storage capacity of transactions
on Testnet, which allow storing kilobytes of code on the blockchain. Addition-
ally, this technique enables the botmaster to reuse the same code several times,
saving coins and reducing its traffic. By using shell and script commands, bots
are not limited to the functions their code implements, but are able to perform
a variety of attacks, making it harder to estimate their real capacity.
6 Experimental Results
We created a PoC botnet that implements our protocol, and then, we simulated
its basic activities. In particular, we verified the ability to send, receive, execute
and reply to commands. We then calculated the necessary amounts of coins
needed for each type of transaction we use. Our results show that the proposed
protocol is both viable and sustainable.
6.1 Non-standard transactions and fees
As a preliminary step, we verified the ability to send non-standard transactions
on the network. We also tested the limits we could reach while still having
transactions relayed.
As stated in Section 4, non-standard transactions allow us to do the follow-
ing:
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• send OP RETURN outputs that are larger than 80 bytes,
• send repeated outputs, both OP RETURN and addresses,
• send dust outputs,
• send transactions larger than 100 kB.
We used Bitcoin Core v0.18.0 to perform our tests. We had to patch its
code to allow creating transactions with repeated outputs (OP RETURN or
address). All other tests were possible without any modification.
For what concerns OP RETURN size, we successfully sent transactions car-
rying as much as 50 kB of data. All transactions got immediately relayed and,
after some time, mined. Although theoretically possible to send more, we were
not able to send transactions carrying more data due to a limitation on the size
of the argument that can be passed through the Linux command line2. As such
we were not able to verify the ability to send transactions bigger than 100kB.
However, we are confident this is actually possible, as this limit is not enforced
for non-standard transactions.
Transactions with repeated outputs, both addresses and OP RETURN, were
also accepted and relayed by all peers.
For what concerns dust outputs, we successfully sent transactions with as
little as 0 satoshis, having them relayed and mined.
6.2 PoC
We implemented the C&C server with our patched version of Bitcoin Core, while
bots run an SPV node using bitcoinj, which did not need any modification
to use our protocol. Both bots and the C&C server run on a Linux operating
system.
Encryption For asymmetric encryption and digital signature, we use RSA
with a 2048-bit key and OAEP padding, which generates outputs of 256 bytes.
This allows bots to send up to 214 bytes of encrypted data to the botmaster.
For symmetric encryption we use AES with 256-bit keys, using CRC block
mode and PKCS5 padding. This encryption mode requires a random 128-bit
IV (Initialization Vector), which is also needed for decryption. As the IV does
not need to be secret, we send it in clear along with the cyphertext.
Fees The default MRF value on Bitcoin Core clients is set to a value of 1000
satoshis (sats) per kB. However, with the introduction of the so-called Segre-
gated Witness (BIP141), transaction fees became dependent on what is known
2This is a known limitation of the Linux kernel; the actual argument size limit depends on
the stack size of the system[21].
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as virtual size, which is a function of the actual transaction size 3. More specif-
ically, the current MRF is calculated as 1 sat/vB, where vB stands for virtual
Byte.
In our implementation, we make use of the embedded functions of the clients
to calculate this value for each transaction.
Transactions As stated in Section 5, we have the following types of transac-
tion: quotas, registration, fundings, commands and responses. All transactions
in our protocol have only one input.
Quotas transactions have 11 outputs, corresponding to batches of 10 quotas
plus the change address. Each quota corresponds to the MRF of a registration
message.
Registration messages have a quota as the input and 1 OP RETURN output
containing the payload. The payload contains a 36-byte-long Testnet address
and a 32-byte-long AES key, encrypted with the public RSA key of the botmas-
ter, which generates an output of 256 bytes.
Fundings contain two outputs: the bot address, receiving the funds, and the
change address of the botmaster.
Commands and responses have 1 OP RETURN output, plus the change
address of the sender. Hardcoded commands have 3 bytes for the command
plus the arguments (e.g. a target). The payload is encrypted with AES, so
their output size corresponds to the size of the payload, padded to fit the block
size (16 bytes), plus the IV (16 bytes). So, for example, an instruction like
dos www.domain.com, which is 19-byte long, will have a data output of 32
bytes. Adding the IV we have 48 bytes. The script command has the following
format: scr TXID KEY, where TXID is a 32-byte-long transaction ID and the
key is a 32-byte AES key. The corresponding IV is stored alongside the script
itself.
Commands We implemented the following commands: dos and stop as hard-
coded commands, lshw as shell command, and one script command called
screenshot. After executing shell and script commands, bots convert the output
to a hex string and send it as a response message. To convert outputs into hex
they use the following command: $(CMD) | tr -d ’\n’ | xxd -r -p, where
CMD stands for the command they are executing. The dos command makes the
bot attack a specific target, which is sent as a parameter. The DoS attack is
performed using hping3 and can be interrupted by a stop command. This
command has no output. The lshw shell instruction makes the bot gather in-
formation about the hardware of the infected machine. On our bot machine,
this command generates approximately 12 kB of data. The screenshot script is
shown in Listing 1.
3The virtual size v is computed as v=(w+3*s)/4, where w is the size of the transaction
and s is the size of the corresponding base transaction (without the witness). In case of
non-SegWit transaction, the virtual size is the actual size.
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This script takes a screenshot in PNG format, which is around 500 kB, then
compress it to JPEG format, reducing its quality to fit into 50 kB of data. The
cat command dumps the content of the file to produce the output to send as a
response.
7 Discussion
In this section, we analyze the sustainability of our protocol in terms of the
amount of coins needed to run a botnet, as well as the robustness of its archi-
tecture and the security of its design.
7.1 Cost Analysis
Funding the botnet At the time of writing, we were able to find six active
faucets on the web. The amount of coins obtained per request varies from 0.0001
to 0.089 tBTC, with an average of 0.05 tBTC per request. By making a single
request per faucet, we obtained approximately 0.12 tBTC. Requests are usually
limited by faucets to one per day, for each given IP address. However, it is
not hard to bypass the limit by using VPNs or proxy services. Furthermore, as
previously discussed, a botmaster could run a miner to obtain a much greater
amount of coins, without any restriction.
As such, we consider the estimate of 0.1 tBTC per day as a conservative
lower bound of the funds that a botmaster can obtain to operate its botnet. In
a real-life context, it is likely feasible to obtain ten to hundred times more than
such an amount.
Protocol messages cost As discussed in Section 5, all messages sent by the
botnet spend the minimum relay fee (MRF), which is directly proportional to
the size of the message and calculated as 1 satoshi per virtual byte.
In our protocol, transactions can have a fixed size, like quotas, registrations,
and fundings, or variable size, like commands, responses, and scripts. Table 1
shows the MRFs for all transactions used in our protocol. For a quota batch
transaction, which has 11 outputs, a MRF of 454 sats is needed. Registration
transactions have a payload of 256-byte long, corresponding to a MRF of 373
sats. Fundings, which have 2 outputs, can be sent with 166 sats. Commands
payload size is the smallest multiple of the AES block size (16 bytes), plus the
IV (16 bytes). To simplify things, we assume hardcoded commands are short
enough to fit into 2 blocks (32 bytes), which adds up to 48 bytes, with the
import −window root s c r e en sho t . png
convert −qua l i t y 5 s c r e en sho t . png s c r e en sho t . jpg
cat s c r e en sho t . jpg
Listing 1: The screenshot script
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Message OP RETURN (Bytes) Fee (Satoshis)
Quotas Batch N/A 454
Registration (quota) 256 373
Funding N/A 166
Hardcoded Command 48 161
Shell Command 17 - 116 133 - 230
Script Command 83 197
Script (Transaction) 117 - 51200 231 - 51349
Response 17 - 51200 133 - 51349
Table 1: Minimum relay fees for our protocol transactions
addition of the IV. To send such a transaction, a fee of 161 sats is needed. We
also assume shell commands are smaller than 100 bytes, with bigger instruction
sent as scripts. Since the minimum size is 17 bytes (1-byte command plus the
IV), the MRF varies from 133 to 230 sats. Script commands have a 3-byte
command plus a 32-byte transaction ID, a 32-byte script encryption key and
the IV. This sums up to 83 bytes, requiring a MRF of 197 sat. We assume the
maximum size of script transactions and responses is 50kB. For what concerns
our non-hardcoded commands, we have the following values. The encrypted
screenshot script, along with the IV, is 128-byte long, corresponding to a MRF
of 242 sats. To send the response (50kB), 51349 sats were needed. To send the
output of lswh (12kB), 12860 sats were needed.
Running the botnet To have 1000 bots registered, 100 quota batches are
needed, corresponding to 373000 sats. Considering the fees for the batch trans-
actions (45400 sats), this sums up to 418400 sats (0.004184 tBTC), which is
then the amount required to register 1000 bots. To fund the same number of
bots, assuming an initial funding of 0.0001 tBTC each, and considering fees for
the funding transactions (166000 sats), we have a total of 0.10166 tBTC. This
means that 0.1 tBTC (our estimated lower bound) are enough to register and
fund 1000 bots per day.
For what concerns daily operations, assuming a specific behaviour is hard,
as C&C communications for real botnets can be very diverse. As such we will
focus on the number of bytes that can be sent per day by a 1000-bot botnet,
assuming it is funded with 0.1 tBTC per day. To simplify things, we assume
1 sat is needed to send 1 byte of data. This way, 0.1 tBTC is enough to send
around 10MB per day, which translates to 10kB per bot in our example, which
is likely to be insufficient for a modern botnet, according to available statistics
[10].
However, by analyzing the Testnet blockchain, it is easy to see that a solo
miner could obtain an average budget of as much as 4 tBTC per day, which
would allow the botmaster to run, for instance, a spamming botnet, or to use
this channel as a component of a larger hybrid botnet.
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7.2 Architecture analysis
Testnet Despite being a testing network, Testnet is a very solid blockchain,
as it constitutes a fundamental component of the Bitcoin ecosystem. In fact,
it allows developers to test changes to the protocol and new applications with-
out wasting money or messing the real chain. Specifically, being released in
2012, the current version of the network (Testnet3) is one of the longest-running
blockchains in the wild. Although a new version might be introduced, this would
affect a lot of ongoing projects and protocol improvements development, making
it unlikely to happen soon. As such, Testnet is a very stable backbone for a
botnet C&C system.
A possible drawback of leveraging Testnet for a botnet might be its reduced
network size, as fewer nodes might ease detection. However, the botmaster
could mitigate this by deploying more nodes.
Faucets Faucets are a vital service for Testnet, as they allow developers to
easily obtain the coins they need tu run their tests. In their absence, developers
would need to run a miner, making their job both harder and more expensive.
As such, it is unlikely that such services will cease to work.
Bandwidth Despite the use of non-standard transactions in our protocol al-
lows transmitting bigger amounts of data, message size is still limited compared
to the traditional client-server model. However, this system gains in terms of
robustness, as communications are very hard to disrupt.
Given the above, it is possible that a real botnet would adopt a hybrid ap-
proach, with commands and responses happening on the blockchain, and larger
data transmission being sent to a server, whose address changes periodically
and gets updated via transactions.
7.3 Security
Stealthiness As communications happen via transactions, botnet messages
will be permanently stored on the blockchain, creating an accessible evidence
of past botnet activities and facilitating their analysis. Furthermore, the use
of non-standard transactions makes it easier to recognize botnet messages. To
mitigate this risk, the botmaster can limit their usage to only a part of the
communications, trying to make other messages more similar to regular trans-
actions.
Encryption All communications in our protocol are encrypted. However, if
a bot is compromised, the adversary can learn both the botmaster public key
and the botnet key, enabling the monitoring of all the messages coming from the
botmaster. While this can help fighting the botnet activities, it does not prevent
other bots from receiving and executing commands, thus being irrelevant to their
operation.
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To prevent this risk, the botmaster could encrypt and send messages indi-
vidually for each bot. This would make the protocol more expensive and less
scalable but it might still be feasible if the botmaster were able to obtain coins
at a fast rate.
Shared Account In case a bot is compromised an adversary can also learn
the private key of the shared account and try to drain all the funds, preventing
new bots from registering.
A possible solution for the botmaster would be to employ a backup reg-
istration system, such as an external channel where new bots can post their
encrypted registration message. To avoid disruption, the botmaster can regu-
larly change it and communicate the updated info via transaction4.
Another way the adversary can steal funds is to register fake bots to get the
corresponding coins sent by the botmaster. This would increase the cost of the
botnet and possibly make it infeasible to sustain. The botmaster, however, can
monitor and test bots to detect and ban misbehaving ones. As an additional
precaution, the botmaster could initially send a smaller amount of coins, and
only send more if the bot behaves as expected.
Another issue, related to the shared account, is that it allows to compute the
size of the botnet in terms of spent quotas. To mitigate this risk, the botmaster
could periodically spend quotas at a random rate. Although this would make
the system slightly more expensive, it would effectively conceal the real number
of bot registrations.
Countermeasures As mentioned above, the non-standard nature of the trans-
actions used in our protocol allows to detect many of the botnet messages. Ad-
ditionally, if a bot is compromised, it is possible to monitor and decrypt all
messages from the botmaster. Furthermore, new bots can be prevented (or at
least hindered) from registering.
Nonetheless, blocking botnet communications is hard as they are embed-
ded into valid transactions. If a botnet is detected, messages coming from the
botmaster could be prevented from spreading. However, this would be in sheer
contrast with the anti-censorship principle at the base of the Bitcoin blockchain.
The most effective way to limit botnet communications would be to disallow
non-standard transactions. However, it is unclear how this would affect the
regular operations of Bitcoin developers.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we showed how it is possible to implement a bidirectional en-
crypted C&C communication system on top of Bitcoin Testnet, which is both
practical and economically affordable. We described a viable protocol that al-
lows to register, fund, and control bots. Communications between bots and
4Note that bots are able to receive messages from the botmaster regardless of their regis-
tration status
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botmaster are encrypted and allow exchanging large amounts of data, enabling
advanced functionalities, such as outsourcing bots code to the blockchain. Ac-
cording to our estimates and experimental results, this system could be used in
real life to run a small spamming botnet or as a component for larger hybrid
botnet architectures.
This should call for an effort in either limiting the possibility of misusing
Bitcoin Testnet for malicious purposes or devising appropriate countermeasures.
Future work includes a characterization of the communication patterns should
be done to help designing effective detection mechanisms, as well as an anal-
ysis of strengths and weaknesses of this kind of botnet protocols, along with
a study of valid alternatives. Finally, an estimation of the impact that such
malicious activities might have on the network could help to evaluate undesired
side effects.
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